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NOTES
The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief,
and Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary
Relief Under the Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act' permits the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to petition a district court to enjoin preliminarily
an acquisition or merger which the Commission believes will violate the
antitrust laws.' The Act provides that a court may enjoin a proposed
acquisition when, upon "weighing the equities and considering the Com-
mission's likelihood of ultimate success," the injunction would be in the
public interest.' The public interest standard, against which the propriety
of injunctive relief is measured, is substantially different from the tradi-
tional equity standards governing interim relief in civil cases.' Section
- 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982).
2 The § 13(b) power to seek preliminary relief extends to anticompetitive behavior out-
side the merger and acquisition context. See, e.g., FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665
F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
This note, however, deals exclusively with § 13(b) as applied to an underlying substantive
claim based on § 7 of the Clayton Act. The latter prohibits acquisitions whose effects "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
Section 13(b) provides in full:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Com-
mission and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside
by the court on review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon
has become final, would be in the interest of the public-
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose
may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any such act
or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering
the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the
public interest, and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond: Provided,
however, That if a complaint is not filed within such period (not exceeding
20 days) as may be specified by the court after issuance of the temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the order or injunction shall be
dissolved by the court and be of no further force and effect: Provided further,
That in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the
court may issue, a permanent injunction. Any such suit shall be brought in
the district in which such person, partnership, or corporation resides or
transacts business.
3 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982).
Preliminary relief in the federal courts is generally sought pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65. Traditionally, standards for preliminary injunctions have focused
on the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, the prospects of irreparable harm,
the comparative hardships on the parties, and sometimes, the impact of the requested relief
on the public interest. Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525,525-26 (1978). See also 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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13(b) does not, however, specify what this public interest entails and courts
have treated section 13(b) petitions in an inconsistent fashion.5
This note considers the appropriate standards by which courts should
evaluate FTC requests for preliminary injunctions under section 13(b).
It suggests that a proper judicial analysis must pursue a wide-ranging
inquiry into the precise facts and into the various public and private
equities of each case to determine whether preliminary relief will serve
the public interest. The note proposes, in light of the often anticompetitive
practical effects of issuing a full-stop order and the limitations of section
13(b) summary proceedings, that courts should grant the FTC injunctions
only in the most egregious cases. Instead, courts should permit consum-
mation of the merger by denying the injunction or by forcing the FTC
to rely on well-conceived hold separate decrees pending full administrative
adjudication on the underlying merits. This sort of interim relief, along
with the traditional remedy of divestiture, protects the public interest
in effective antitrust law enforcement without discouraging procompetitive
business decisions which promote consumer welfare.
This note initially considers the legislative framework of section 13(b)
and proposes some practical and policy considerations which should guide
section 13(b) analysis. It then discusses the FTC's interpretation of sec-
tion 13(b) and the way in which the law has been applied by the courts.
Finally, the note explores the statute's command to weigh the equities
as the correct focal point of section 13(b) litigation and examines two recent
decisions.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT SECTION 13(b):
ITS UNDERLYING BASES
Section 13(b) is one-half of a legislative scheme designed to improve the
FTC's ability to enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act6 at the premerger
stage Prior to 1973, the Commission was without express statutory
authority to seek preliminary relief in section 7 cases; instead, the FTC's
exclusive statutory remedies consisted of cease and desist and post-
S 2948, at 430-31 (1973); see generally 7 J. MooPE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
65.01-65.21 (2d ed. 1982).
See infra notes 59-101 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. S 18 (1982).
The other half of this premerger legislative scheme is found at 15 U.S.C. 5 18(a) (1982).
It contains notification provisions which prohibit the acquisition of the voting securities
of certain corporations unless advance notice is given to the Justice Department and the
FTC. The Act specifies a waiting period before the acquisition can be finalized during which
the Justice Department and the FTC have an opportunity to evaluate the competitive effect
of the proposed transaction. The government may request additional relevant information
to conduct its evaluation. For a thorough discussion of the premerger notification provi-
sions, see Comment, The Goal of the New Premerger Notification Requirements: Preliminary
Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 1979 DUKE L.J. 249.
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acquisition divestiture orders as authorized by the Clayton Act.' To
compensate for the perceived deficiency of these traditional remedies,
the Commission used the All Writs Act 9 as an alternative route to
premerger intervention. The Act allowed the FTC to petition directly
to the court of appeals to enjoin an allegedly anticompetitive acquisition.10
This procedure, however, was rife with procedural impracticalities and
doctrinally unsound.1 Section 13(b) gave the district courts jurisdiction
to entertain FTC petitions for preliminary relief and eliminated the Com-
mission's need to resort to the All Writs Act.
The precise language of section 13(b) and its legislative history offer
little guidance in assessing the proper judicial role in ruling on the pro-
priety of premerger injunctive relief. The section was initially attached
to the Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 2 by floor amendment and
was accorded only two paragraphs in the final Conference Report." From
study of the legislative history, only the following can be affirmatively
asserted. Courts applying section 13(b) are not to use traditional equity
analysis because the statute codifies a "public interest" standard which
is more appropriate where an independent regulatory agency is enforcing
a federal law.'4 This public interest approach is emphasized by the absence
of any reference to "irreparable harm"-a traditional requisite to
preliminary relief-in the statutory language. 5 On the other hand, Con-
8 15 U.S.C. 21(b) (1982). Accord FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966).
28 U.S.C. 1651(a) (1976) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
10 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) held that under the All Writs Act, the
FTC could get interim relief blocking the merger only upon establishing, in the court of
appeals "that an effective remedial order, once the merger was implemented, would other-
wise be virtually impossible, thus rendering the enforcement of any final decree of divestitute
futile." Id. at 605. The ease involved the respondent's acquisition of Bowman Dairy Company,
a substantial competitor in packaged milk sales in the Chicago area. According to the Com-
mission's allegations, accepted as true by the Court, id. at 601, Dean Foods planned to
liquidate and distribute among Bowman shareholders that part of the acquired corporation
it did not consolidate into its own corporate structure. Id. at 599. Bowman "would
consequently cease doing a dairy business" in Chicago and consummation of the merger
would prevent the Commission from devising an effective remedy after its decision on
the merits. Id. at 599-600.
11 See, e.g., Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive Powers Under the Alaska
Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 872,877-78 (1975); Kelley, Preliminary
Injunctions in FTC Merger Cases: A Proposal for Expanded Use of Preliminary Structural
Degrees, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1979); see also infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
12 Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act § 408(f), 15 U.S.C. S 53(b) (1982).
13 H. CONF. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2523, 2533.
" The report states that "[t]he intent is to maintain the statutory or 'public interest'
standard which is now applicable, and not to impose the traditional 'equity' standard .... Id.
" Although Kelley, supra note 11, at 10, argues that the absence of "irreparable harm"
means Congress intended that the FTC should be able to obtain preliminary injunctions
in almost every case, this interpretation is hardly encouraged by the statute. Instead, ir-
reparable harm is merely presumed from a showing of likelihood of success. See FTC v.
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gress preserved and articulated the duty of the courts to "exercise in-
dependent judgment"'6 in ruling on the propriety of an injunction in any
particular case. After completing the analysis mandated by section 13(b),
the district court may enjoin the merger; the law does not command that
the court shall issue the injunction. 7 This reliance upon judicial discre-
tion finds a parallel in the traditional equity analysis of preliminary relief.8
Finally, the report indicates that congressional intent was to codify
previous case law and not to mandate a new analytical approach to
preliminary injunctions sought by the government.
The purpose of section 13(b) has been more adequately defined by the
courts. In FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.," the court held that sec-
tion 13(b) was not enacted to authorize automatic injunctions;" rather,
section 13(b) was enacted "to preserve the ability to order effective,
ultimate relief [and] not to bar all mergers that the FTC staff preliminarily
views as suspicious."'2 The view that the purpose of section 13(b) is to
preserve the ability to order ultimate relief accurately reflects the
Supreme Court's concern in FTC v. Dean Foods' that consummation of the
proposed acquisition would have rendered "an effective remedial order
... virtually impossible."'"
Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In fact, the FTC still argues
that it will suffer "irreparable harm" should the injunction not issue in every case in its
assertion that postacquisition divestiture is an inadequate and ineffective remedy following
an adjudication on the merits.
16 H. CONF. REP. No. 624, supra note 13.
In Weyerhaeuser the court emphasized that "Congress expressed a plain purpose to
codify decisional law, not to straightjacket it [and that consequently] S 13(b) does not 'man-
date' remedial rigidity." 665 F.2d at 1084.
11 See Collum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1978); Chicago Stadium Corp. v.
Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1976, 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE S 2948, at 427 & n.13 (1973); see also Deckard v. Independent Shares Corp.,
311 U.S. 282 (1940); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 526.
" The report states that the "new language is intended to codify the decisional law
.... H. CONF. REP. No. 624, supra note 9.
528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
" Id. at 99.
Id. at 87 (citing FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,972, at 79,538 (D.D.C.
1979), affd, 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1083-84. A
law review note has further observed:
A court hearing a request for preliminary order must determine how best
to create or preserve a state of affairs such that it will be able, upon conclusions
of the full trial, to render a meaningful decision for either party. Only the
necessity of judicial intervention for the accomplishment of this purpose justifies
imposing upon the defendant the burden of conforming to an order granted
after a summary proceeding.
Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1056 (1965) (emphasis
added).
" 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
2 Id. at 605. This assertion is also supported by the decision in Exon where the court
stated that Dean Foods illustrated the "concerns [which] later motivated Congress to grant
the FTC, in [S 13(b)], the express authority to petition in District Court for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction." 636 F.2d at 1343. See also Weyerhaeuser, 665
F.2d at 1085 ("the underlying intent [of 5 13(b) is] to secure effective antitrust enforce-
ment"). See generally supra note 10.
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Case law interpretation of the purpose of section 13(b) confirms the
view that section 13(b) was meant to reform the preliminary relief pro-
cess under the All Writs Act. The earlier process was procedurally
awkward, requiring an ill-equipped court of appeals to receive evidence
and hear witnesses as a trial court. Furthermore, judicial intervention
under the All Writs Act could be analytically justified only if such inter-
vention was required to preserve the appellate jurisdiction of the court
of appeals being petitioned." The burden of proof thus imposed upon the
FTC was necessarily harsh." The Court's 5-4 split in Dean Foods and the
strong, well-reasoned dissent by Justice Fortas illustrate that any use
of the All Writs Act in the section 7 context was a close and controver-
sial questionY Dean Foods thus represents the Supreme Court's concern
with the inadequacy of postmerger divestiture and the need for a pro-
cedure to allow the FTC to intervene at an earlier point in section 7
enforcement.
The inadequacy of divestiture in certain cases28 and the procedural and
substantive problems incurred by resort to the All Writs Act were the
impetus for the enactment of section 13(b). The FTC undeniably needed
a procedure by which it could intervene more easily into the early stages
of possible anticompetitive behavior and section 13(b) gave the Commis-
sion this procedure. The statute specifies the proper tribunal and the stan-
dard by which FTC petitions for injunctive relief are to be evaluated.
Nothing, however, in the statute or its legislative history, supports the
assertion that obtaining the injunction should be substantively easier than
prior procedure.' In fact, the legislative history of the premerger notifica-
tion statute3 supports the opposite conclusion.' The most affirmative
I The All Writs Act permits the court to issue only those writs "necessary or appropriate
in aid of [its] jurisdiction ...... 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
11 Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 605 (requiring a showing that effective postmerger relief be
"virtually impossible" before intervention is justified); see also Halverson supra note 11,
at 877-78.
384 U.S. at 612. The dissenters argued:
The statements in the Court's opinion indicating that its result is necessary
unless we are to "stultify congressional purpose" fly in the teeth of the record,
plainly written and repeatedly reiterated. Congress is keenly interested in
enforcement of § 7. But it has demonstrated over and over again that it has
no interest in arming the Commission with the power today conferred upon it.
Id. at 613 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
See infra note 42. See also Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 608-11.
Certain commentators have argued, however, that the issuance of a preliminary in-
junction should be virtually automatic, see, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST § 215, at 671 (1977) ("courts ought to be disposed to enter orders maintaining the status
quo whenever the government offers by affidavits a colorable case .... ), but automatic
injunctions were explicitly rejected by Congress. See infra note 31.
20 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982). See also supra note 7.
3, The premerger notification statute, 15 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1982), as originally introduced,
provided for an automatic stay of the proposed merger solely upon certification by the
FTC that the public interest required relief pendente lite. This power was resolutely
denounced. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 15,420 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Percy). See also supra note
7.
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statement that can be made about section 13(b) as passed is that a pro-
cedure for seeking preliminary relief should and will be more easily
accessible to the FTC.
MAKING THE SECTION 13(b) DECISION
Guiding Principles
The district court under section 13(b) may enjoin a merger when, after
weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of
ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest.2 The ap-
plication of this "public interest" standard has caused the courts con-
siderable trouble and the section 13(b) cases develop divergent
approaches.
3
At one extreme is the decision in FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc.,' in
which the judicial role in section 13(b) cases was effectively relegated to
that of a mere rubber stamp on the FTC's motion to enjoin the merger.
The Food Town Stores court failed to acknowledge the primary purpose
of section 13(b) by refusing to consider the defendant's argument that
divestiture would be an adequate remedy should an antitrust violation
ultimately be found.-' Furthermore, the court's balancing of the equities
excluded any private harm which may have resulted from enjoining the
acquisition" and rejected, as too speculative, any consideration of the
public benefits expected to flow from the merger.' This case rejects the
discretion and independent judgment which Congress explicitly required
the courts to exercise in section 13(b) cases and establishes a rule which
guarantees that the FTC will obtain every injunction it seeks.3
The other end 'of the interpretive spectrum is best represented by FTC
v. Weyerhaeuser Company.9 In Weyerhaeuser, the lower court refused to
' See supra note 2.
' See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. Exxon Corp.,
636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); FTC
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1978); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549
F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Food Town Store, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated
as moot, 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 529 F.2d 196 (3d Cir.
1976) (en banc); FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1981); FTC
v. Southland Corp., 471 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1979); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp.
785 (N.D. Ill. 1978); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); FTC v. Pillsbury Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,200 (N.D. Ill. 1976). See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 507 (1977).
"' 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1345-46.
" Id. at 1346.
37 Id.
See, e.g., FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ill. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
see also FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co.,
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enjoin a merger even though it has found that the Commission had
established a "likelihood of success on the merits."40 While the precise
result in Weyerhaeuser may be an anomaly not envisioned by Congress,41
the fact that courts have the power to make such a decision consistent
with section 13(b) is the headstone of this note's thesis. The proper judicial
approach to section 13(b) cases must be built around the rationale, both
express and unarticulated, at the core of the Weyerhaeuser ruling. This
rationale is developed below.
Section 13(b) Litigation: The Practicalities
Several undeniable practicalities are inherent in any section 13(b) litiga-
tion. These factors shape the proposed analysis and their importance
should not be understated. The major catalyst in the legislation of sec-
tion 13(b) was the perceived inadequacy of postadjudication divestiture
as an effective remedy to section 7 violations." This congressional and
587 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1978); FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D.
Ill. 1981). For a recent comment on the Weyerhaeuser decision, see Comment, Antimerger
Suits and the Standard of Preliminary Injunctive Relief After Federal Trade Commission
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 62 B.U.L. REV. 777 (1982).
' Weyerhaeuser, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974, at 76,047. Instead, the district court
entered a hold separate order-a type of preliminary relief less drastic than an injunction-
which requires the acquiring company to preserve the acquired assets as a viable com-
petitive entity pending administrative adjudication of the antitrust claims. Id. at 76,048.
The entry of the hold separate order was affirmed by the court of appeals. FTC v.
Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d 1072, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"' Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1085-86. The Weyerhaeuser court of appeals recognized that
when the Commission establishes a likelihood of success, a preliminary injunction should
probably issue. Id. at 1085. However, the court noted that the statutory language is per-
missive, not mandatory, and held that an injunction need not issue where significant equities
favor the transaction and a hold separate order can realistically be expected to safeguard
the possibility of successful ultimate relief and prevent interim competitive harm. Id.
At least one court has held that where a less severe remedy, such as a hold separate
order, will protect the public from interim competitive harm, a preliminary injunction should
not issue. United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Pfunder,
Plaine & Whittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19,117 ("If divestiture can pro-
vide adequate ... relief ... then preliminary injunctions can be granted sparingly");
Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 541 ("If the final judgment can remedy the plaintiffs injury,
there is no reason to grant immediate protection which may turn out to be based on error").
42 Halverson describes the divestiture problem as follows:
In instances when production facilities have been integrated into the corporate
structure of the acquiring firm, it can be predicted that divestiture is less
likely to cure the competitive problem created by a merger than when facilities
have been kept separate. An additional consideration, especially in industries
involving special know-how or technological expertise, is whether key manage-
ment and other highly skilled personnel are likely to have been transferred
or discharged and thus no longer available to their prior employer. Further,
if transfer of technological expertise and trade secrets from the acquired firm
to the acquiring firm has occurred after merger, divestiture becomes a remedy
of questionable value in restoring competition to its original state. The pro-
cess of corporate absorption can further sap the competitive vitality of the
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judicial concern is well placed; however, it is also true that divestiture
is not always as inadequate a remedy as the FTC argues. When the merger
involves only a stock acquisition, the threat of integration and consequent
inadequacy of divestiture is not substantial.43 Furthermore, in mergers
which entail the acquisition of physical assets or of low or similar
technology, divestiture may adequately protect the public interest in main-
taining a competitive market." Considering that the major purpose of
section 13(b) is to preserve the ability to order effective and ultimate
relief,45 where the court finds divestiture to be an effective postmerger
remedy, a preliminary injunction may not serve the public interest.46
Though the occasional inadequacy of divestiture implicates a policy of
preventive enforcement, there is strong support to argue that the limited
goals of section 13(b) should be implemented in the least restrictive fashion.
First, while most courts decide section 13(b) cases following expedited
discovery and a brief evidentiary hearing, an injunction could potentially
issue without any hearing at all." Even where the standard abbreviated
hearing is held, it involves only a preliminary evaluation of the merits
under a relatively light burden using relaxed rules of evidence. The court's
decision must necessarily be based on an "imperfect, incomplete and fragile
market and undermine the curative powers of divestiture when the manage-
ment of the newly combined enterprise begins to participate in joint plann-
ing, strategy, and decision making processes which affect the future status
of competition in the market. In these circumstances, by the time the illegality
of the acquisition is finally established, there may be no practical way to devise
an effective remedy that will reestablish the merged firm as a viable com-
petitive entity.
Halverson, supra note 11, at 875-76. See also FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785,
787 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (the "statutory enactment [of S 13(b)] manifests Congress' concern with
the FTC's historic inability to effectuate a remedy once an acquisition is consummated.");
FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Elzinga, The
Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969); Kelley, supra note 11, at
4 n.11.
L . SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 670 n.6.
" See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. Great Lakes Chem.
Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1981); See also FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,972, at 79,538-39 (D.D.C. 1978), affd, 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("there is
no reason to conclude that the FTC . . . would be unable to order effective relief by way
of divestiture ... [because this] is not a case involving a proposed combination between
two direct, horizontal competitors ... nor one in which the acquiring company contemplates
disposing of assets of the acquired company or distributing its cash or securities .... )(citations omitted). See generally Pfunder, supra note 41, at 129-37 ("Divestiture appears
to be an inadequate remedy.., in markets characterized by a high degree of concentration
and vertical integration.").
41 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Pfunder
supra note 41, at 117.
4, See, e.g., Lancaster Colony, 434 F. Supp. at 1091 ("...we see no need for an eviden-
tiary hearing nor for extensive analysis of the underlying antitrust issues."); 1 S. KANWIT,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 10-13 to -14 (1981) (the FTC "may also grant or deny such relief
without holding a hearing").
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factual basis"48 and any court's evaluation of the merits based on such
a record must be of limited reliability.49
The second, and integrally related, point is concerned with the precise
and practical effect of a section 13(b) injunction. Courts have long
acknowledged that the issuance of a preliminary injunction prior to a full
trial on the merits is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy."' This is
"particularly [true] in the merger and acquisition context"51 where
experience has demonstrated that "the grant of a temporary injunction
in a Government antitrust suit is likely to spell the doom" of the proposed
merger.s In fact, in the three section 13(b) cases in which the FTC has
recieved full injunctions blocking the mergers, the proposed acquisitions
" Lancaster Colony, 434 F. Supp. at 1091.
" In each of the S 13(b) cases which has proceeded to an ultimate decision on the merits,
the preliminary evaluation of the antitrust allegations performed by the district court proved
to be wrong. In the British Oxygen litigation, the district court found that the FTC had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and issued a preliminary remedy. The
Commission also ruled against the defendants in the administrative hearing but the court
of appeals reversed on the merits. Compare FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 1974-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,003 (D. Del. 1974) and British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241 (1975) with BOC Int'l
Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977). In the Beatrice Foods cases, the district court and
the court of appeals found that the FTC had not established a likelihood of ultimate suc-
cess, but an FTC administrative law judge ruled for the Commission on the merits. Com-
pare FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1978) with Beatrice Foods Co.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,775 (Nov. 21, 1980). In FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., both the district
court and an FTC administrative law judge ruled that the FTC would not succeed on the
merits, but those holdings were reversed by the full commission. Compare FTC v. Ten-
neco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977) and Tenneco, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,700 (May 27, 1980) with In re Tenneco, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 464 (1981). Perhaps the strongest
argument for the approach to § 13(b) adjudication urged in this note is found in the
Weyerhaeuser cases. As discussed more fully at infra notes 114-56 and accompanying text,
the district court in Weyerhaeuser acknowledged a likelihood of success on the merits but
nonetheless refused to enjoin the proposed merger. Weyerhaueser, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,974 (D.D.C. 1981). The court of appeals also found that the FTC had made a strong
showing on the merits but affirmed the lower court's decision recognizing the inherent
limitation on judicial capacity to assess reliably anticompetitive effect at that early junc-
ture in an antitrust complaint. Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court's
foresight proved accurate. In a lengthy and thorough opinion, an FTC administrative lawjudge ruled against the FTC on all antitrust claims, holding that the Commission had "fail[ed]
to establish that Weyerhaeuser's acquisition ... may lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly, in any line of commerce in any section of the country. In re Weyerhaeuser
Co., FTC Docket No. 9150, slip op. at 97 (Oct. 11, 1983).
' Medical Society v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1977), cited in FTC v. Exxon Corp.,
636 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. at
84, 86 (N.D. I. 1981).
", Great Lakes Chem., 528 F. Supp. at 86 (citing Exxon, 636 F.2d at 1344).
' Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974); see also Exxon, 636 F.2d at 1343; Great Lakes Chem., 528 F. Supp. at
86. United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. at 757-58; United States v. Northwest Indus.,
301 F. Supp. 1066, 1095-97 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Lewis, Preliminary Injunctions in Government
Section 7 Litigation, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 7 n22 (1982); The Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1975; Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 513 (1975-1976) (statement
of Prof. Joseph F. Brodley).
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were killed and full administrative hearings never took place.-" That a
proposed merger can effectively be killed by a section 13(b) injunction
when there has never been an adjudicative determination of anti-
competitive effect belies a fundamental unfairness in section 13(b)
procedures.' This "killing" effect could be further aggravated by a relaxed
standard of proof and FTC abuses of the section 13(b) power to enjoin
acquisitions.
If congressional antitrust policy were to discourage industry growth
by merger, the effects of section 13(b) injunctions would be of little con-
cern, but this has never been the case.5 Mergers are an "important
mechanism in the creation of social wealth"56 and many of the mergers
which the FTC has opposed through section 13(b) have had prospective
procompetitive and societal benefits.57 Where the injunction is issued, these
' See FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977); Lancaster Colony, 434 F. Supp. 1088; see also United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963) (merger abandoned following grant of
preliminary injunction); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964)
(same); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(same).
' An analogy can be drawn to the procedural due process problems raised by the gar-
nishment and replevin cases in the 1970's. In effect, the acquiring company's presumptively
legitimate property interest in the acquired company is being "taken" without an adjudica-
tion of the merits of the underlying antitrust allegations which, if established, would be
the only factor that could prevent consummation of the merger. See Leubsdorf, supra note
4, at 543-44; Pfunder, supra note 41, at 116; see generally North Georgia Finishing v. Di-
Chem., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
1 The rationale behind allowing some mergers is stated by antitrust commentator Donald
Turner:
Widespread prohibition of mergers would impose serious, if not intolerable,
burdens upon owners of businesses who wished to liquidate their holdings
for irreproachable personal reasons. . ... Moreover, economic welfare is
significantly served by maintaining a good market for capital assets. By
enhancing the value of assets when owners wish to sell, a strong capital assets
market increases the rewards of successful entrepreneurial endeavor. In this
way the possibility of mergers stimulates the formation and growth of new
firms, though the extent of this effect is of course highly speculative. More
importantly, a policy of free transferability of capital assets tends to put them
in the hands of those who will use them to their utmost economic advantage,
thus tending to maximize society's total output of goods and services.
Growth by merger, like internal growth, will often yield substantial economies
of scale in production, research, distribution, cost of capital, and management.
Entry by merger, like entry by new growth, may stimulate improved economic
performance in an industry characterized by oligopolistic lethargy and ineffi-
ciency. Finally, acquisition of diversified lines of business, by stabilizing pro-
fits, may minimize the risks of business failure and bankruptcy.
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313,1317
(1965); see also J. Weston, Industrial Concentration, Mergers and Growth, in 2 U.S. DEP'T.
OF COMMERCE, MERGERS AND ECONoMIC EFFICIENCY 62 (1981); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 199-200 (1978).
R. BORK, supra note 55, at 199; see also G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 50 (1980).
5 Cf. FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1346 (4th Cir. 1976) (court acknowledged
that enjoined merger would have enabled "the buying public [to] purchase more economically
at [the defendant's stores] than at ... any of [the defendant's] other competitors:'); FTC
v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same). In FTC v. Weyerhaeuser
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benefits were irretrievably lost. Considering that ultimate consumer
welfare must be a primary goal of the antitrust lawsM an interpretation
of the section 13(b) statutory standard that permits these proconsumer
benefits to be sacrificed to a preliminary and cursory determination of
anticompetitive effect based on "an imperfect, incomplete and fragile"
record is shortsighted.
Interpreting Section 13(b): Principles Applied
As prerequisites to requesting an injunction from the district court,
the FTC must have reason to believe that the merger will violate the
antitrust laws and that enjoining it would be in the public interest.59 Noting
that the statutory standard for relief is also one of the "public interest,"
one commentator has argued that "ft]his redundancy raises a question
about the need for a judicial determination of the issues."6 Judging from
the statute's face, this concern is legitimate. In practice, however, the
Commission itself has interpreted away any surface redundancy in sec-
tion 13(b). The FTC has narrowly defined the "public interest," in the
section 13(b) context, to mean only the effective enforcement of the an-
titrust laws.6 The two findings necessary before the FTC can seek the
Co., 655 F. 2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981), had the court enjoined the acquisition, society would
have lost the "procompetitive benefits from construction of a new linerboard mill with
attendant improvement in the area employment rate:' Id. at 1088. In addition, "an almost
certain increase in the supply of linerboard ... on the West Coast and the export would
have been lost." Id. at 1075. Similarly, in FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp.
84 (N.D. Ill. 1981), enjoining the merger would have sacrificed the life of the acquired com-
pany, id. at 96-98, necessary research and development in the industry, benefits to the
local community, and the promotion of foreign trade. Id. at 98. See also supra note 55.
Generally speaking, there exists a myriad of potential economic benefits from merger
activity. All the financial economics studies indicate that "on average, value is increased
by mergers and ... shareholders of acquired firms realize gains that are statistically signifi-
cant." J. Weston, Industrial Concentration, Mergers and Growth, in 2 U.S. DEFT. OF COM-
MERCE, MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 62 (1981). These gains "provide both a check on
and a stimulus to managerial performance." Id. Mergers also require that "asset reevalua-
tions take place, thereby encouraging efficient allocation and movement of capital ......
1 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 4 (1980) (prefatory remarks
by J. Fred Weston to a panel discussion of Weston's study, Industrial Concentration, Mergers
and Growth, printed in 2 U.S. DEFT. OF COMMERCE, MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 4
(1981)). Conglomerate mergers "permit entry [into markets] in circumstances where de novo
entry might be very difficult .... Id. at 5. Mergers are also a "necessary part of the
long-range planning process of firms in responding to market opportunities .... " Id. Finally,
the diversification which mergers facilitate "reduce bankruptcy risk and bankruptcy losses:'
Id.
,' R. BORE, supra note 55, at 7. Bork argues quite convincingly that "[a] consideration of
the virtues appropriate to law as law demonstrates that the only legitimate goal of anti-
trust is the maximization of consumer welfare." (emphasis in original).
See 15 U.S.C. 5 53(b) (1982) (quoted supra note 2); see also Halverson, supra note 11, at 879.
Kelley, supra note 11, at 16.
6, FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The Commission urges
that there is no other equity to weigh here other than the one it advances-the public
interest in effective antitrust enforcement.").
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injunction under section 13(b) consequently merge through the following
tautology: Where the FTC believes a merger will violate section 7, it
necessarily believes that the law must be effectively enforced; effective
enforcement means seeking the preliminary injunction; because the public
interest in section 13(b) cases is served only by effective enforcement,
the injunction, ipso facto, must be in the public interest. In effect, this
means that the FTC will seek an injunction whenever it believes that
a merger will violate section 7.
This dereliction of statutory duty by the FTC leaves the decision
whether a preliminary injunction would truly be in the public interest
to the courts. After the Commission has brought the suit, the operative
language of the section 13(b) judicial standard requires the courts to decide
whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. This
decision is to be based upon a consideration of the Commission's likelihood
of ultimate success and a weighing of the equities. Following this analysis,
a court may issue an injunction.2
Likelihood of Ultimate Success
The section 7 showing required before a court will issue a preliminary
injunction has caught the attention of recent commentators' and received
a diverse treatment by the courts. No exact showing is specified in the
statute. In fact, section 13(b) on its face requires only that courts "con-
sider" the likelihood of ultimate success, and not that the FTC establish
this likelihood to any particular degree.' Nonetheless, some courts have
come very close to requiring the FTC to prove the underlying section
7 allegation. In FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.,65 the court held that
the FTC has a "substantial burden" under section 13(b) and required the
Commission to prove "'not that the merger in question may possibly have
an anti-competitive effect, but rather that it will probably have such an
effect."'66 Similarly demanding versions of the section 13(b) likelihood of
success requirement surfaced in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.67 and FTC
v. Tenneco, Inc.6" In each of these cases, the FTC failed to establish the
requisite likelihood of success to allow the court to issue the injunction. 9
12 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 11, at 20-29; Note, Standards for Evaluating Requests for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Merger Cases, 12 Loy. U. Cim. L.J. 503 (1981); [hereinafter
cited as Note, Merger Cases]; see also Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcement
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 771 (1965) (discussing pre-1977 merger law).
64 See supra note 2.
528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. I1. 1981) (denying injunction).
Id. at 86 (emphasis added), citing United States v. Amsted Indus., 1972 Trade Gas.
(CCH) 73,902, at 91,743 (N.D. Iil. 1972).
, 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
' 433 F. Supp. 105, 114 (D.D.C. 1977).
69 Atlantic Richfield, 549 F.2d at 300; Tenneco, 433 F. Supp. at 113.
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Less strict showings of "likelihood" have been permitted in several
cases. In FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp.,7" the FTC needed to establish
only "a fair and tenable chance" of ultimate success on the merits.7 A
third standard, adopted from the context of private merger law, was
applied in FTC v. National Tea Co.72 and FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co.' Those
courts were satisfied when the FTC raised "serious and substantial ques-
tions going to the merits. 74
The proper interpretation of the likelihood of success requirement must
be guided by the substantive and procedural context of section 13(b) litiga-
tion and the precise statutory language. The court in FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp. displayed excellent insight into the court's role vis-a-vis the
section 7 allegation in this sort of summary proceeding:
As a practical matter, a district court can hardly do more at so early
a stage of antitrust litigation than to make a considered estimate of
the FTC's apparent chances of success based upon what must
necessarily be an imperfect, incomplete and fragile factual basis ....
It, therefore, seems clear that the Congress intended that in applica-
tions under Section 13(b), the district court be guided by preliminary
and tentative findings of fact without attempting to resolve the
underlying antitrust issues of fact.75
Even after lengthy adjudicative hearings, determination of these underly-
ing antitrust issues demands complex and time-consuming analysis. These
complexities are amplified in the section 13(b) context, when a preemp-
tive resolution may be based on as little as one day of trial,76 or on no
trial at all. 7 A black letter rule which establishes one particular degree
of likelihood as the showing to be required subrogates the public interest
7' 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
71 Id. at 1090.
,2 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
587 F.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Accord FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp.
785, 789 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
,' National Tea, 603 F.2d at 698; Beatrice Foods, 587 F.2d at 1229. This "substantial and
serious question" test derived from Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d
738 (2d Cir. 1953), but received limited application until it was restored in Sonesta Int.
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). See Note, Merger Cases,
supra note 63.
The problems inherent in applying a legal standard which has developed in the private
merger law context to government-sought injunctions are apparent. Private parties are
motivated by an entirely different set of concerns when challenging an acquisition of their
own company by an aggressive pursuer, and section 7 is often used as a tool to fend off
an unwanted take-over bid. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 671-72 & n.9; see also Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 257-66.
," FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). As in any
summary proceeding, it would be reversible error for the district court to "purport to
settle finally the questions of law and fact raised by the complaint:' Industrial Bank v.
Tobriner, 405 F. 2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wisconsin Tel.
Co., 289 U.S. 67, 70 (1933); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
2950 (1973).
' See, e.g., FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1342. (4th Cir. 1976).
" See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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to the underlying merits of the section 7 violation and undercuts the "in-
dependent judgment" 8 courts are to exercise when considering the pro-
priety of injunctive relief. Had Congress intended section 13(b) to become
an abbreviated section 7 case, it could have easily written the statute
to accomplish that end.
The better approach to the likelihood of success issue is found in the
statuory command to "weigh... the equities and consider ... the Com-
mission's likelihood of ultimate success." 9 That Congress expressly pro-
vided a double-edged analysis to determine whether the public interest
would be served by preliminary relief should not be lightly regarded. The
two-step directive suggests a sliding scale analysis. ° Where the equities
strongly favor the FTC, the Commission's burden on the underlying
substantive issues should be appropriately reduced. However, where
public and private equities favor consummation of the transaction, the
Commission should be required to make a substantial showing on the
merits.
This sliding scale approach, though never expressed in such terms, is
reflected in some of the case law. In FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc.,8"
the court found the public equity favoring consummation of the merger
too speculative to be accorded any weight in the section 13(b) calculus;'
the only equities which favored the transaction were the private harms
to the parties should the acquisition be enjoined.' Accordingly, the
likelihood showing required of the FTC by the court was relatively light.'
On the other hand, there were significant public and private equities which
supported the proposed acquisition in FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.'
In that case, the court denied the Commission preliminary relief after
7 15 U.S.C. 818 (1982)(quoted supra note 2); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d 1072, 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d at 1339, 1343 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC
v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1981); H. CONF. REP. No. 624,
supra note 13.
" Accord, Kelley, supra note 11, at 28-29 n.141.
" This approach has never been suggested by the courts or commentators. However,
the logic of the argument seems compelling. The court, realizing that its evaluation of the
section 7 allegations can be hardly more than a "considered estimate," see FTC v. Lan-
caster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. at 1091, may initially focus upon the equities of par-
ticular case-factors which are susceptible of proof at this early state in the litigation. Then,
depending upon the nature of those particular equities, the court may require more or
less of a showing of "likelihood." An added benefit of this approach is that it forces the
FTC to take a more focused attack in each S 13(b) case it would bring as opposed to its
customary reliance upon the one broad equity behind which the Commission typically hides-
the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement. See infra notes 89-93 and accompany-
ing text.
, 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1345-46.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344-45. See also FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
Great Lakes Chemical, 528 F. Supp. at 98-99.
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holding that the government had not met a high standard of proof on
the likelihood of success."6
A sliding scale analysis accounts for the problematic nature of the
underlying antitrust determinations required of the court in the section
13(b) context and is consistent with the statutory language which directs
that after "considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success"87
a court may enjoin the merger. Furthermore, the approach serves two
goals inherent in the public interest standard of section 13(b). First, it
incorporates into section 13(b) analysis the independent judicial discre-
tion envisioned by Congress. Second, and more importantly, the sliding
scale directs judicial and analytical attention to what should be the proper
and primary focus of section 13(b) litigation-a probing consideration of
the equities.
WEIGHING THE EQUITIES: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND COLLATERAL
Although section 13(b) mandates a weighing of the equities in deciding
whether an acquisition should be enjoined, the courts, perhaps
unsurprisingly, have developed widely differing approaches to exactly
what the statute requires them to weigh.88
The FTC has asserted that section 13(b) demands a dichotomy between
public and private equities and that private equities-harms to the
merging parties and their stockholders-should "merit no or, at most,
minimal weight" in the section 13(b) calculus. 9 Instead, the Commission
narrowly urges that the only proper equity for the court to weigh is the
one the FTC itself advances-the public interest in effective antitrust
enforcement.' However, even the Commission does not dispute the fact
I Id. at 86-87. See also United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980). In
that case, brought by the Justice Department rather than the FTC, the court held:
Nor does proof of likelihood of success on the merits relieve a court of equity
of duty to balance hardships, i.e., determine whether the harm to defendants
outweighs the likelihood that adequate relief will be available to the Govern-
ment if the merger is consummated ... To be sure, once the Government
has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, the equities will
usually tip in its favor, since private interests must be subordinated to public
ones, but surely where the harm to defendants is great and there is little likelihood
that consummation of the merger would jeopardize ultimate relief, the court clearly
may deny injunctive relief orfashion prophylactic measures to obviate the threat
of harm
621 F.2d at 506 (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982) (emphasis added). Note also that this approach, in that it re-
quires the court to weigh the equities before it moves on to a consideration of the merits,
is consistent with the order of analysis implied by the language of the statute.
Compare FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1081-83, 1089-91 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
with FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1976).
FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
,o Id. at 1081. A close look at this statement illustrates a further inconsistency in the
Commission's position. The obvious roots of the "single equity" argument lie in the presumed
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that proposed mergers often benefit the public and that enjoining them
can cause public harm.91 According to the Commission, however, considera-
tion of these public harms and benefits is precluded by the statute "unless
they relate to the relevant market" and could form part of a defense to
the Commission's antitrust complaint.92 Public harms and benefits-those
unrelated to the relevant market-may be called collateral equities and,
the FTC argues, are irrelevant in a section 13(b) case.9"
The FTC's interpretation of the equity analysis required by section 13(b)
has found acceptance in certain courts. The district court in FTC v. Food
Town Stores, Inc.,9 found that the defendants would be substantially
harmed by interim injunctive relief15 and enumerated seven potential
effects of a preliminary injunction blocking the merger.9" On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit noted that all of these harmful effects went "to the private
injury which [might] result from an injunction delaying the merger"9 and
held that private harms "are of such a nature that they are not proper
inadequacies of divestiture as an effective remedy following consummation of a merger.
The inadequacy of divestiture, however, is an equity of which courts, in S 13(b) cases, typically
take account. See, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1980). By the
Commission's own argument then, should divestiture be an adequate remedy, no injunc-
tion should issue preventing the merger. The Commission clearly does not support this
position even though it is the natural extension of its own argument.
Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1082-83.
Id. at 1082.
" The Commission's argument relies on an oft-quoted passage from United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), in which Justice Brennan, speaking for a divided
court, stated:
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of
such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in
any event has been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the
amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive
economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the
malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price might have
to be paid.
Id. at 371 (emphasis added). The FTC's reliance on this case for the proposition that the
only equity to be weighed is the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement is
misguided. Philadelphia National Bank was a S 7 case and its relevance to 5 13(b) analysis
is limited. Section 7 forbids all anticompetitive mergers; it makes no provision for any
sort of balancing between the competing interests. To apply Brennan's S 7 analysis to a
S 13(b) injunction case, where Congress has explicitly directed the courts to "weigh . ..
the equities" and consider the public interest is plainly wrong.
539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976) (district court case discussed on appeal).
's Id. at 1345.
These included: subjecting the acquired party to lawsuits by creditors and stockholders;
requiring Food Town Stores to file new registration statements with the Securities and
Exchange Commission; adversely affecting the market value of Food Town Stores' stock;
subjecting the acquired party to a potential loss of personnel at its home office and
warehouses; requiring the acquired company to try to arrange substantial new financing
on very short notice; and requiring the solicitation of new proxies before the stockholders'
meeting. Id.
Id. at 1346 (emphasis in original).
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considerations for granting or withholding injunctive relief under 5 13(b)." 98
The rationale behind the court's decision was a much criticized interpreta-
tion of the statute, 9 but Food Town Stores has been followed in other
decisions.110
The practical effect of rulings like Food Town Stores and of the FTC's
reading of section 13(b) has been a radical simplification of the judicial
analysis required in section 13(b) cases. When a court follows these rules,
once the Commission shows a likelihood of ultimate success and a pro-
spect of interim harm should the merger go unchecked, a preliminary
injunction blocking the acquisition "should issue without further ado."''
The better reasoned analysis considers the full range of public and private
equities when determining whether a preliminary injunction would ac-
tually be in the public interest.
Support for Considering the Full Range of Equities
Support for considering the full range of public and private harms in
a section 13(b) hearing is found in the statute, its legislative history, and
case law applications. As originally proposed, section 13(b) would have
permitted the district court to enjoin an acquisition upon "a proper show-
ing that such action would be in the public interest."'' The court was
not required to weigh the equities or consider the Commission's likelihood
of ultimate success.' That the final version of section 13(b) passed with
express reference to the equities should not be "brushed aside as essen-
tially repetitive or meaningless.' 4
The short reference to the statute in the conference report adds further
support to this argument.0 In enacting section 13(b), Congress intended
9"I d.
One commentator provides a representative sample of the criticism directed at this
portion of the decision. Kelley, supra note 11, at 29-32.
11 FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 791 (N.D. Ill. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
101 See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"2 119 CONG. REC. 522, 979 (daily ed. July 10, 1973).
,.. This language was added in conference. H. CONF. REP. No. 624, supra note 13, at 31,
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523,2533. It is interesting, though perhaps
not surprising, that the FTC's construction of S 13(b), in that it reads out private equities
altogether and all public equities except the effective enforcement of antitrust law, would be
exactly right-if the original bill had passed. Apparently, the Commission did not always
construe the § 13(b) equities in such a narrow fashion. A former Director of the FTC's
Bureau of Competition had this to say about the S 13(b) command to the equities: "What
it seems to mean ... is that the district court may weigh the injury that would result
to the public or competition if an injunction is not granted against any injury that would
be incurred by the defendant or others if the injunction is granted." Halverson, supra note
11, at 881.
' FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"' See H. CONF. REP. No. 624, supra note 13, at 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2523, 2533.
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to codify the standards which courts were already applying to govern-
ment requests for preliminary injunctions in merger cases."' These earlier
cases had established that equitable considerations must be taken into
account regardless of whether they could either be asserted as defenses
to the section 7 allegations or "relate to the relevant market.""1 ' In addi-
tion to signaling congressional intent to codify the decisional law, the
report also defines the judicial role in a section 13(b) case to include the
exercise of independent judgment." 8 This independent judgment would
be lost if courts followed FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc."0 9 or the FTC's
self-serving interpretation of what section 13(b) requires. As the court
so aptly recognized in FTC v. Weyerhaeuser. "independent judgment is
not exercised when a court responds automatically to the agency's
threshold showings [on the merits]. To exercise such judgment, the court
must take genuine account of the 'equities.".. 0
The most substantial support for fully considering public and private
equities at the section 13(b) stage of an antitrust complaint is found in
two recent opinions. The courts in FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp."'
and FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co." 2 perceived the equitable analysis required
by 13(b) in its proper form: those courts balanced alongside the public
interest in a competitive economy, the "potential benefits, public and
private, that may [have been] lost" had the injunction issued.1 It is this
analysis, not that of FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., or of the FTC, which
should guide courts addressing the propriety of section 13(b) injunctive
relief.
Public Equities
Public equities break down into two groups: those which favor consum-
mation of the merger and those which support enjoining the transaction.
The former are collateral equities which represent the expected benefits
to the public at large. The latter, argued by the Commission of course,
are the same in every case and implicate the public interest in preserving
a competitive market pending administrative adjudication of the
100 Id.
10. See, e.g., FTC v. PepsiCo., 477 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1973) ("We must balance the equities
when a supplicant seeks injunctive relief."); United States v. Heileman Brewing Co., 345
F. Supp. 117, 121 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766, 797 n.95 (D.
Conn. 1969) (a "balancing of the equities ... is a relevant factor ... in deciding whether
to deny or grant injunctive relief").
100 H. CONF. REP. No. 624, supra note 13, at 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2523, 2533.
.. 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977).
1l0 Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1082.
" 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
m 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11 Id. at 1083 (emphasis added). See also FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d
708, 717 (9th Cir. 1976).
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underlying merits. This interest subsumes two parallel, if not equivalent,
concerns: the need for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws114 and
the inadequacy of divestiture as an ultimate remedy1 These important
concerns gain additional weight when the Commission has made a showing
of likelihood of success. It is at this point in the analysis that the FTC
would have the courts stop and issue the injunction regardless of the public
and private effect of enjoining an acquisition."' It is at precisely this point,
however, that the Weyerhaeuser court refused to stop.11 7
In Weyerhaeuser, the FTC sued to enjoin a merger between the defen-
dant and Menasha Corporation. Before the merger, Weyerhaeuser was
the largest producer of corrugated containers in the United States and
the seventh largest producer of corrugating medium, a component of the
containers, on the West Coast." Menasha, a privately held family cor-
poration, was the third largest producer of corrugating medium on the
West Coast."1 The merger "would place Weyerhaeuser in the lead position
among West Coast medium producers."1 20
Through the merger Weyerhaeuser would have acquired several
assets' but the FTC challenged only the acquisition of a corrugating
medium mill. Acquisition of this mill, the Commission argued, would
"eliminate Menasha as a competitor in an already concentrated West Coast
corrugating medium market, significantly increase concentration in that
market and increase" the possibility of collusive pricing among the
remaining producers. 2 The district court denied the preliminary injunc-
tion even though it found that the FTC had established a likelihood of
success on the merits."2 Instead, a hold separate order was entered to
prevent interim anticompetitive harm. 4 In weighing the equities, the
11, Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1083.
11 See supra note 42.
111 Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1081.
117 The Weyerhaeuser court ultimately held that:
[I]t is permissible for the court to weigh among "the equities" the potential
benefits, public and private, that may be lost by a merger blocking preliminary
injunction, whether or not those benefits could be asserted defensively in a
proceeding for permanent relief. We do not believe that the district court,
mindful that its "likelihood of success" evaluation is only a forecast, should
be precluded from taking into account the costs entailed should its prediction
prove erroneous.
Id. at 1083.
II Id. at 1074.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
12 Id.
11 FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974, at 76,047-49 (D.D.C. 1981).
12 Id. at 76,049. A hold separate order is a form of preliminary injunction which allows
the challenged merger to go forward but demands that the acquired company and its assets
be maintained as an independent operating entity pending resolution of the full administrative
hearing. The purpose of this type of order is to preserve the acquired company as a separate
and viable competitor until the merger's legality is determined and to prevent a commingling
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lower court held that eventual divestiture would be an adequate remedy
and prevent long-run competitive harm should "the FTC succeed ... in
its administrative complaint."1 2 In light of the purpose of section 13(b),
of the merging companies' assets so that the acquired company may be promptly and effec-
tively divested should the FTC ultimately prevail. The authority upon which a hold separate
order is entered is traditionally based upon the "inherent equitable powers" of the court.
See United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196, 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
Recent courts, however, have found this authority in S 13(b) or in the "inherent powers."
See, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,972, at 79,539 (D.D.C. 1979),
affid, 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While dissenting Judge Mikva in Weyerhaeuser and
the FTC both argued that S 13(b) empowers the court to issue only a full stop order or
no order at all, there seems to be "scant sense in [making] this distinction." FTC v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d at 1084 (majority opinion). The power to issue preliminary
relief in the form of a hold separate order was established in the very first government
attempt to enjoin a merger. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo.
1959), affd, 370 U.S. 294 (1963).
There are two legitimate criticisms of the use of a hold separate decree. The first, argued
by the FTC and Kelley, supra note 11, at 29-30, asserts that the sort of comprehensive
and supervisory order necessary to maintain the acquired company as a separate and viable
competitor forces the court into an improper exercise of article III judicial power by requiring
the court to, in effect, run the business. The short answer to this lies in the far-reaching
remedial powers of the judiciary; courts do this sort of thing all the time. By statute or
in equity, courts have regularly taken an active role in what is traditionally nonjudicial
business. For instance, under the bankruptcy laws, a court has the authority to appoint
an interim trustee in certain circumstances. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
SS 303(g), 701 (1982). In Chapter 11 business reorganization cases, and in Chapter 13 individual
reorganization cases, courts oversee the protection of the creditors' and equity security
holders' rights, 11 U.S.C. SS 1104(a), 1108, 1302. The enforcement of contracts by specific
enforcement is another example. See 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 5 1171 (1964).
Additionally, courts have become integrally involved with the political processes in the
voting rights and prisoners' rights cases, and in Boston's school desegregation problem,
where the federal court in effect ran the city's school board. See United States v. Manning,
215 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963); see also Prison Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1971); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), affid, 530 F.2d
401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). Considering these cases, limited judicial
intervention occasioned by implementation of a hold separate order is hardly objectionable.
The second criticism is aimed at the real ability, in any case, of a hold separate order
to protect against interim competitive harm and to preserve the adequacy of eventual
divestiture. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 670-71, 673 (1977)
("courts should not lightly assume that [hold separate orders] are adequate to assure that
the merger can later be effectively undone"); see also Note, "Preliminary Preliminary"
Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82 YALE L.J. 155, 165 (1972). This overgeneralized
concern ignores the fact that the FTC has put its own stamp of approval on the adequacy
of this sort of preliminary relief. See, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); FTC v. Pillsbury Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,200, at 70,470 (N.D. Ill. 1976);
A.G. Spaulding & Bros., 56 F.T.C. 1125, 1126 (1960). It also ignores the fact that a court
will not issue a hold separate order in lieu of a full stop decree where the former will
not adequately protect all the interests involved. This is an appealable decision and, as
the court of appeals in Weyerhaeuser explained, a
hold separate order ... should not issue absent careful review of the par-
ticular features of the proposed merger and a reasoned determination from
the evidence that the milder restraint will operate as an adequate preser-
vative impeding interim harm, and safeguarding eventual divestiture and in
view of the equities entailed, genuinely serve the public interest.
Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1087.
Hold separate orders have been issued in the following merger cases: Weyerhaeuser,
665 F.2d 1072; Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 486 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); United States
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this fact should weigh heavily against granting the requested injunction.
The court went further, however, and found that there were other public
benefits that would "support less drastic interim relief."'26 It identified
the increase of "linerboard supply on the West Coast, and for export"
and the "increase... [of] employment in the North Bend area" as public
benefits resulting from and favoring the merger.'7 On appeal, the FTC
argued that these public equities "do not count" because they neither
relate to the relevant market nor could they be asserted as defenses to
the alleged antitrust violations." This argument, however, was summarily
rejected by the court of appeals which held that a court should weigh
among the equities the potential public benefits that might be lost "by
a merger-blocking preliminary injunction, whether or not those benefits
could be asserted defensively in a proceeding for permanent relief."'2 9
The court in FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp. also recognized the
propriety of balancing against the public interest in preserving a com-
petitive economy, the public, albeit collateral, benefits of the merger."'
The case involved a proposed merger between the Great Lakes Chemical
Corporation and Vesicol Chemical Corporation. Great Lakes is an
integrated producer of elemental bromine and bromine derivatives, and
an aggressive national marketer of brominated flame retardants."' Vesicol,
whose principal business is the production of agricultural pesticides,
became a producer of elemental bromine and bromine derivatives in 1976.11
The challenged transaction was Great Lakes' acquisition of Vesicol's
bromine fields and bromine-related receivables."' At the time of the sec-
tion 13(b) hearing, Vesicol's El Dorado plant was temporarily shut down
and the Michigan facility was conducting only minimal research."4
v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes
Land Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766 (D.
Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); United States v. Northwest Indus., 301
F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969); FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,972 (D.D.C.
1979), affd, 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Pillsbury Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,200 (N.D. Ill. 1976); FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,003 (D.
Del. 1974); United States v. Herff Jones Co., 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,099 (S.D. Ind.
1967); United States v. Iowa Beef Packers, 1971 A.B.A. Merger Case Digest 553 (N.D. Iowa
1969); United States v. First Nat'l. City Bank, 1971 A.B.A. Merger Case Digest 439 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 1971 A.B.A. Merger Case Digest 429 (E.D. Wis.
1965).
22 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974, at 76,048.
Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1083 (discussing district court opinion).
1 Weyerhaeuser, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974, at 76,048.
128 Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1082-83.
" Id. at 1083. On this point, even the dissenting judge agreed. Id. at 1092-95 (Mikva,
J., dissenting).
12 FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 86-87 (N.D. IIl. 1981).
Id. at 85.
22 Id. at 86. Of Vesicol's 1980 net sales, only about seven percent were bromine or bromine
derivatives.
13 Id.
" Id. This was an essential factor in the decision to deny the injunction. The court found
that Vesicol was no longer a viable competitor in the brominated flame retardant business
and that consequently, the FTC's market share data was an inaccurate guide to prospec-
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The court denied the Commission preliminary relief. It acknowledged
at the outset that the FTC "must show that the equities favor enjoining
the transaction" and that "public equities such as increased exports and
benefits to local communities ... can lead to denial of preliminary relief
.... ,"Is The court went on to enumerate several public equities which
favored consummation of the proposed transaction. 136 Noting that the
stimulation of additional international activity is procompetitive and
beneficial,137 it found that the merger would serve the national interest
by promoting foreign trade. 8 The court also found that allowing the pro-
posed acquisition would encourage entry into the bromine and other high-
risk industries by clearly indicating that a potential entrant would not
be stuck in an industry by an FTC no-exit policy if the "ship starts to
sink."'3 9 Finally, the court ruled that the acquisition will "enhance critically
needed research and development in the industry" and "benefit the local
community of El Dorado, Arkansas.""" These public benefits, in conjunc-
tion with significant private equities' and the fact that "divestiture would
be an effective ultimate remedy" in this case, " 2 justified the court's ruling
that "competition would be improved, not lessened" by the merger.'
Private Equities
Private equities are those harms and benefits to the merging parties
and their shareholders which may result from the court's decision to grant
or deny the preliminary injunction. The role of private equities is appro-
priately less pronounced than that of the collateral, public equities. The
FTC has argued that private equities merit no consideration in section
13(b) analysis and this position was adopted in FTC v. Food Town Stores
tive anticompetitive effect. Id. at 87. One of the key findings which supported this ruling
was that in the flame retardant market, where effective research and development kept
the producer in business, Vesicol had given up. Id. at 91, 98. See also FTC v. National
Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (injunction denied based on similar financial conditions
of the acquired company).
135 Great Lakes Chemical, 528 F. Supp. at 86-87.
Id. at 98-99.
137 Id. at 98 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288, 301 (E.D. Mo. 1931);
United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324, 342-43 (E.D. La. 1968);
United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 195-96 (N.D. Cal. 1967)).
138 Great Lakes Chemical, 528 F. Supp. at 98.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
4 Id. at 99.
143 Id. A different sort of public equity was found to be controlling in FTC v. Exxon
Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,972, at 78,392. There the court, exercising the sound
discretion vested in it by S 13(b), ruled that the "public interest [lay] in this instance in
the development and distribution of improved electrical equipment .. .in the midst of
the present energy crisis ... with maximum efficiency and with significant savings in energy."
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and FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp.' This narrow view, as earlier illus-
trated, proves too much. The court of appeals in Weyerhaeuser articulated
the precise role that private harms and benefits to the merging parties
and their stockholders should play in section 13(b) litigation:
[P]rivate equities merit consideration, although, standing alone, they
do not override an FTC likelihood of success showing .... Prior to
the enactment of Section 13(b), courts weighed private equities in the
balance in cases in which preliminary injunctive relief was sought.
... Since Congress intended to codify that case law, we have no war-
rant to drop private equities from the calculus. However, we agree
with the Commission to this extent. Private equities do not outweigh
effective enforcement of antitrust laws.1
45
Private equities go beyond mere expectations of financial gain from
consummation of the merger.' The lower court in Weyerhaeuser found
that the merger would result in a competitive revitalization of Menasha
and allow the firm to continue in the paper business on a more centralized
basis." 7 In turn, this would improve economic efficiencies."4 The acquisi-
tion would also provide Menasha and its shareholders with a solution to
the liquidity problems which had plagued them throughout the years and
which, absent the merger, "will worsen in the near future.""9 In FTC
v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., the analysis was "permeated by the non-
competitive conditions of Vesicol's bromine-related operations"lu and this
was the key factor in the court's decision. The court concluded that even
if the FTC established a likelihood of success, "the debilitated condition
of Vesicol's bromine operations [would be] an important equity to be con-
sidered because a preliminary injunction would exacerbate Vesicol's pro-
blems even though the [section 13(b)] hearing involved only a tentative
assessment [of the antitrust allegations]." 5' More specifically, the court
ruled that the acquisition would give Vesicol's shareholders a chance to
salvage something from the company's unsuccessful bromine operations
and would give the company an "opportunity to escape its dire financial
straits."' 2 This latter equity, according to the court, "favors denial of the
preliminary injunction.., and was found to be controlling in United States
v. G. Heileman Brewing Co ..... ,1
'. 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
45 FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
14 Id at 1083 n.26.
", FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,263, at 76,048.
148 Id.
" Id. at 76,047.
' FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
15 Id.
152 Id. at 98. This same sort of failing financial condition was controlling in the court's
denial of preliminary relief in FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1979).
"5 Id. Cf., Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,393,
at 76,378 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Application of the Full Range of Equities
The private and public equities which the courts considered in FTC
v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp. and FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co. are primarily
financial and economic efficiency costs and benefits which may result from
consummation of the merger, as well as such public benefits as increased
employment and production supply. While an anticompetitive merger is
not saved at the section 7 trial because it may be beneficial "on some
ultimate reckoning of social and economic debits and credits,"'" a district
or appellate court, mindful that its determination on the merits is only
a prediction, must not "be precluded from taking into account the costs
entailed should its prediction prove erroneous."'1 The restrictive approach
to the equities taken by the FTC and several courts refuses to recognize
a section 13(b) hearing for what it is-the point at which a court must
decide whether or not a preliminary injunction would really be in the
public interest-and strips the courts of the ability to exercise the sort
of independent judgment expressly required by section 13(b). The wide-
ranging inquiry into the equities found in Weyerhaeuser and Great Lakes
Chemical forces the Commission to definitively and legitimately establish
that a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. It recognizes
that not all mergers are bad and that most can have significant benefits."
A full consideration of the public, private, and collateral equities is essen-
tial to developing a proconsumer premerger enforcement policy. This
analysis captures the controlling message of section 13(b)-the need to
preserve and order effective, ultimate relief-and delegates to a subor-
dinate .role any reliance on the underlying section 7 allegations. If
postmerger divestiture is shown to be an adequate remedy, the court
should rarely issue an injunction blocking a merger unless the section
7 violations are so obvious that there is little doubt about the resolution
of the administrative hearing. Where the FTC shows that postmerger
divestiture inadequately protects the public from potential anticompetitive
effects should the merger be found to violate section 7, the court should
permit consummation of the merger under a hold separate order or, in
the worst case, enjoin the transaction altogether.15' The precise remedy
applied by the court must depend completely on the precise facts and
equities of each case. Where collateral equities, that is, public benefits
not related to the relevant market, cannot be established to a reasonably
certain degree by the acquiring company, the court should enjoin the
merger. However, where the proposed merger offers benefits to the con-
'u United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
15 FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
' See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. See also Mantell, Conglomerate Mergers,
Allocative Efficiency, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 56 Tax. L. REv. 199 (1978).
157 See supra note 124.
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sumer public, by improving economic efficiency, reallocating inefficient
productive factors, or increasing supply and employment opportunities,
then even though postmerger divestiture may not be an adequate remedy,
a full stop order enjoining the merger should not issue. The public can
be protected from interim competitive harm by a hold separate decree.
CONCLUSION
Section 13(b) has been too narrowly construed by the FTC and by
several of the courts directed to apply the law. Their interpretation of
the statute, by deleting any meaningful consideration of the equities, has
sacrificed the use of judicial discretion contemplated by Congress and
reduced the judicial role to a mere rubber stamp on Commission requests
for preliminary relief.
Proper analysis under section 13(b) must fully consider the real effects,
both public and private, of the challenged transaction, bearing in mind
that section 13(b) was enacted to preserve the ability of the FTC and
the courts to order effective ultimate relief upon completion of proceedings
on the merits. A mere showing of likelihood of success based on the
minimal record developed in a section 13(b) hearing should not be enough
to merit the issuance of a preliminary injunction blocking a merger. Courts
must examine whether the proposed merger will increase production
efficiencies or result in other economies of scale to the ultimate benefit
of the consumer. Harms and benefits to the companies and their
shareholders should also be considered, as well as general procompetitive
effects on market structure. Finally, a section 13(b) court must assess
collateral equities such as increased employment opportunities and other
community benefits, increased domestic supply and exports, improved
technologies, and energy conservation. This approach does not necessarily
mean that more mergers will survive the preliminary injunction stage
although such a result may be desirable. Adoption of this approach means
only that the FTC must adjust its litigation strategy to conform with
the language of the statute, congressional design, and the practicalities
of section 13(b).
DAVID M. STRYKER
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